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The Institute of Pacific Relations was a pioneering intellectual-political organization that shaped public knowledge and both elite and popular discourse throughout the Asia-Pacific region and beyond during the inter-war years. Inspired by Wilsonian internationalism after the 1919 formation of the League of Nations, it grew to become an international and national non-governmental think-tank providing expertise on Asia and the Pacific. This book investigates post-League Wilsonian internationalism with respect to two critical issues: the nation state and the conception of the Asia-Pacific region.

This article questions the notion of "traditional" security by examining security ideas held by policy elites in the Asia-Pacific, particularly in Japan, from the mid-19th century to 1945. It argues that the idea of securíty of the people was a significant and integral part of the discourse of security during that time. The Japanese case suggests that its implications were not always positive, however. What was problematic was not so much a narrow focus on an external military threat as the way "people" were defined collectively as the nation or national society. As a result, "securíty" was oflen used in the context of imperial aggression or wartime mobilization. The article sees the more recent notion of security— namely, societal security — as a revival of this historical notion of security, and reinforces the point that in order to avoid its negative implications, current debates need to go beyond the nationstate framework.

In Imperial Eclipse, Yukiko Koshiro argues that "[u]nder the US military occupation, the Pacific War narrative eclipsed Japan's Eurasian worldview and produced Japan's postwar amnesia about its colonial empire." Aiming to "restore the comprehensive landscape of Japan's war," Koshiro "returns the Soviet Union to the scene and renames the conflict the Eurasian-Pacific War" (p. 1).

This article questions the notion of "traditional" security by examining security ideas held by policy elites in the Asia-Pacific, particularly in Japan, from the mid-19th century to 1945. It argues that the idea of securíty of the people was a significant and integral part of the discourse of security during that time. The Japanese case suggests that its implications were not always positive, however. What was problematic was not so much a narrow focus on an external military threat as the way "people" were defined collectively as the nation or national society. As a result, "securíty" was oflen used in the context of imperial aggression or wartime mobilization. The article sees the more recent notion of security— namely, societal security — as a revival of this historical notion of security, and reinforces the point that in order to avoid its negative implications, current debates need to go beyond the nationstate framework.

In Imperial Eclipse, Yukiko Koshiro argues that "[u]nder the US military occupation, the Pacific War narrative eclipsed Japan's Eurasian worldview and produced Japan's postwar amnesia about its colonial empire." Aiming to "restore the comprehensive landscape of Japan's war," Koshiro "returns the Soviet Union to the scene and renames the conflict the Eurasian-Pacific War" (p. 1).

Exactly 20 years after the first undersea cable was laid across the English Channel in 1851, the last leg of the north- and south- bound cable networks reached Japan via Shanghai, connecting all the continents, except for the Antarctic. This age of global telecommunications coincided with two moves by the major empires in the late nineteenth century: their aggressive colonization in Africa, Asia and the Pacific; and the expansion of the franchise at their metropolitan centres. Overseas news was conveyed more quickly, and affected more people's views of the world. As metropolitan states gradually expanded their franchise bases, these peoples' views (the public opinion) were becoming an important factor not only in domestic politics, but also in foreign policies. The states had to respond to these developments of technology and mass-based politics, realize the power of news, and come to see the need to develop policy and institutions to utilize news in foreign policy. As soon as global telecommunication networks were established, three major news agencies — British Reuters, French Havas, and German Wolff — created an inter-imperial news cartel system in 1870, and Northeast Asia came under Reuters' news empire. Using the notion of 'news propaganda', this book analyses how the Meiji state came into the inter-imperial news system, and how it became aware of the problem of Reuters' news empire in Northeast Asia. It also examines how the Japanese state began to develop the governmental institutions and a key operational agency, the national news agency, to utilize news propaganda in international politics, and how it challenged Reuters' news agency in the region with a help of American Associated Press. The book demonstrates the modern thinking of foreign policy elites, including high- to – middle-ranking diplomats, military officers and news agency men. They were well attuned with global trends, technological development, and the rising significance of 'international public opinion'. They responded not with isolationism from, but with greater engagement with the world public in the time of diplomatic crises and international conflicts. Their challenge to Reuters' news empire was not a structural challenge to the inter-imperial news system, but a quest for Japan's greater power in that system, and closely connected to the military expansion into China.

Liberalism in Japan before 1945 has been understood to be problematic because of its disposition to embrace elitism, nationalism and imperialism. These problems are often argued to have been caused by particular Japanese impediments, such as its history, customs, culture and system, and accordingly it is suggested that a 'proper' development of liberalism as seen in the 'West' did not occur in Japan. This essay argues that these problems are in fact problems inherent in the internal logic of liberalism in the modern period, and especially in the age of mass-based democracy and of empire. It argues so by expanding the thesis of Berlin on liberty of 1958, and examining the notion of 'positive liberty' in particular. The essay argues that the Japanese case articulates an often-neglected and problematic aspect of the discourse of liberalism, and concludes that this aspect needs to be seriously taken into account in an exploration of a critical alternative to currently dominant neo-liberal visions and institutions.

This article argues that what we now call public diplomacy emerged in the mid- to late 1930s in the case of Japan. It questions the notion that public diplomacy is new in contrast to 'traditional' diplomacy. It also questions the conventional understanding of Japan's diplomatic isolationism of the 1930s. The article argues that as a result of greater mass political participation, the idea of 'international public opinion' emerged as a new norm in inter-war international politics. States increasingly regarded news and cultural activities as crucial resources of their soft power for winning this international public opinion. Responding to technological developments in communications, they developed a more systematic approach to propaganda in order to utilize these resources in mainstream foreign policy. Even in the age of the socalled rise of nationalism and diplomatic isolationism, Japan could neither afford not to respond to other states' actions nor to ignore international public opinion. In the diplomatic crises of the 1930s, Japan began to coordinate news and cultural propaganda activities, and integrated them into a broader propaganda scheme. Here we see the origin of what is now called public diplomacy. This modern and internationalist thinking then prepared the institutional base for wartime propaganda.

In this chapter I propose the notion of the "nation state/empire" as a new way of conceptualising an actor in international politics, and as a basic unit in an analysis of international politics for the period between the late nineteenth century and 1945. The period is exemplary for two reasons. First, in the late nineteenth century, the nation state that was based on popular or national principles of legitimacy became prominent: at the same time, many nation states were competing for new colonial acquisitions. Second, as elaborated below, many empires retained formal colonies throughout the interwar period. In the first section of the chapter I will demonstrate how this notion of the nation state/empire can be located in debates on the state system. Acknowledging a recent move to incorporate empire both as an idea and as an actor in analyses of international relations, the chapter nonetheless questions a still widely assumed dichotomy between the nation state and empire in these works, and suggests the need to see them as an integral unit. This also means the need to see the European state system and the extra European system as an integral whole. It argues that the international society of the time may be best understood not as a society of relatively equal national states, but as one composed of nation states/empires with diverse power. In the second section of this chapter I apply this notion whilst examining the international politics of Northeast Asia between the late nineteenth century and 1933. I see Japan as an empire in which the problem of the international society of nation states/empires was manifested.

Exactly 20 years after the first undersea cable was laid across the English Channel in 1851, the last leg of the north- and south- bound cable networks reached Japan via Shanghai, connecting all the continents, except for the Antarctic. This age of global telecommunications coincided with two moves by the major empires in the late nineteenth century: their aggressive colonization in Africa, Asia and the Pacific; and the expansion of the franchise at their metropolitan centres. Overseas news was conveyed more quickly, and affected more people's views of the world. As metropolitan states gradually expanded their franchise bases, these peoples' views (the public opinion) were becoming an important factor not only in domestic politics, but also in foreign policies. The states had to respond to these developments of technology and mass-based politics, realize the power of news, and come to see the need to develop policy and institutions to utilize news in foreign policy. As soon as global telecommunication networks were established, three major news agencies — British Reuters, French Havas, and German Wolff — created an inter-imperial news cartel system in 1870, and Northeast Asia came under Reuters' news empire. Using the notion of 'news propaganda', this book analyses how the Meiji state came into the inter-imperial news system, and how it became aware of the problem of Reuters' news empire in Northeast Asia. It also examines how the Japanese state began to develop the governmental institutions and a key operational agency, the national news agency, to utilize news propaganda in international politics, and how it challenged Reuters' news agency in the region with a help of American Associated Press. The book demonstrates the modern thinking of foreign policy elites, including high- to – middle-ranking diplomats, military officers and news agency men. They were well attuned with global trends, technological development, and the rising significance of 'international public opinion'. They responded not with isolationism from, but with greater engagement with the world public in the time of diplomatic crises and international conflicts. Their challenge to Reuters' news empire was not a structural challenge to the inter-imperial news system, but a quest for Japan's greater power in that system, and closely connected to the military expansion into China.

Janis Mimura focuses on "reform bureaucrats," or more precisely Japanese economic reform bureaucrats during the 1930s and early 1940s. She argues that they promoted "techno-fascism," which "represented a new form of authoritarian rule in which the 'totalist' state is fused with military and bureaucratic planning agencies and controlled by technocrats" (p. 4). Unlike some recent works that have examined fascist tendencies in Japanese culture, ideology, and everyday life, Mimura focuses on bureaucrats' visions and policies. This emphasis illuminates the nature of the political regime in this period.

Janis Mimura focuses on "reform bureaucrats," or more precisely Japanese economic reform bureaucrats during the 1930s and early 1940s. She argues that they promoted "techno-fascism," which "represented a new form of authoritarian rule in which the 'totalist' state is fused with military and bureaucratic planning agencies and controlled by technocrats" (p. 4). Unlike some recent works that have examined fascist tendencies in Japanese culture, ideology, and everyday life, Mimura focuses on bureaucrats' visions and policies. This emphasis illuminates the nature of the political regime in this period.

Japan's information policy did not change suddenly during the Manchurian Crisis in September 1931–March 1933. Rather there was continuing development of state policy and institutions for news propaganda in response to two ongoing phenomena: growing mass political participation as indicated by universal manhood suffrage, and technological changes in mass media and communication. The Japanese metropolitan government did, however, begin a coordinated and systematic approach to news propaganda during the Manchurian Crisis, one primarily driven by foreign policy concerns, rather than concerns with domestic thought control. At the same time, in the period that is often regarded as the beginning of Japan's diplomatic isolationism, MOFA and other foreign policy elites actively sought to engage international public opinion through management of the news for overseas propaganda. They further emphasized coordination between metropolitan centre, Tokyo, and a parallel news institution in Japanese-occupied Manchuria in 1931–3. The process of unifying news coverage, however, met strong oppositions from various stake holders in 1931–5.